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Abstract
Three numerical coverage metrics for the symbolic simulation of dense-
time systems and their estimation methods are presented. Special techniques
to derive numerical estimations of dense-time state-spaces have also been de-
veloped. Properties of the metrics are also discussed with respect to four
criteria. Implementation and experiments are then reported.
Keywords: coverage, verification, symbolic simulation, real-time
1 Introduction
Presently, with verification and integration costs increasing to more than 50 percent
of the development budget in real-world projects, it is more and more difficult to use
traditional simulation technology to acquire enough trace coverage to confidently
create system designs. As well, application of the new formal verification technology
is still hampered by its intrinsic complexity. In the forseeable future, we expect that
simulation and formal verification will be combined for verification of large-scale
real-time systems. Symbolic simulation is such a combination[26]. It uses symbolic
techniques[4, 8, 12, 17] of formal verification to represent space of simulation traces
so that abstract (as opossed to concrete) behaviors can be observed in a trace. For
verification of real-time systems, tools like UPPAAL[24] and RED[27, 28, 30, 31]
support symbolic simulations.
∗The work is partially supported by NSC, Taiwan, ROC under grants NSC 90-2213-E-001-
006, NSC 90-2213-E-001-035, and the by the Broadband network protocol verification project of
Institute of Applied Science & Engineering Research, Academia Sinica, 2001.
Current symbolic simulation technology for real-time systems is still not as devel-
oped as that for untimed systems like Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems.
For one thing, the important concept of coverage can be used to both estimate the
value of a set of traces and to direct the generation of new traces. In short, coverage
is how much has been verified of the target to be verified. The importance of this
concept is that, in real-world projects, it is usually the case that we do not have
enough resources to either run enough traces to obtain confidence, or to complete
formal verification tasks. Product designs usually need to be released before we can
obtain 100% confidence in the designs. Therefore it is important that we have some
type of metric to evaluate confidence in our designs. A common coverage metric
for simulation is code coverage, which measures the proportion of already-executed
Hardware Description Language (HDL) statements during simulation. State and
transition coverages are used in control state machines[19]. These coverage metrics
have proven to be effective in bug escape reduction by pointing out coverage holes
in the test suite. Coverage goals are used to measure the degree of confidence in
the total verification effort, and to help the design team predict the optimal time
for design release[5].
The coverage metrics used in traditional simulation, which is based on concrete
traces, may not be directly applicable to the symbolic simulation of dense real-time
systems, since there are infinitely many concrete traces and states for such systems.
For example, the visited-state coverage metric[6, 25], which uses concrete reachable
states in FSM to estimate coverage, is not suitable for the symbolic simulation of
dense real-time systems. If we directly apply this coverage metric to the simulation
of dense real-time systems, we will always have 0% coverage since the ratio of finitely
many concrete states over the infinite reachable state-space is always zero.
To this end, we propose techniques to estimate numerical coverage for the sym-
bolic simulation of dense real-time systems. As mentioned above, the states in such
systems are dense, and the question follows that how do we count the states, since
”dense” stands for uncountable. Nevertheless, our techniques can estimate the cov-
ered proportion of the reachable state-space, and it is efficient and meanful. We
approach the question by adopting the region-relation[2] to partition dense state-
space, and propose a method to estimate the size of each proportion in section 6.2.
We believe that our techniques can be used to help future development of various
coverage-based verification techniques - including the design of new coverage metrics
and coverage-based test-pattern generation - in real-time systems.
Before we can estimate numerical coverage, we must design a metric and its esti-
mation procedure. This engenders the first research issue of this work, that is, how
do we know if a metric is good ? In section 4, we present four criteria to serve as
guidelines in coverage metric design. These criteria are: accountability (each basic
portion of the target function is counted once and only once), coverability (100%
coverage estimation is achievable), efficiency (the overhead in computing the cov-
erage estimation is low), and discernment (risk states are discernable). According
to these criteria, we adapt three coverage metrics from traditional testing research
and development techniques to implement them in real-time systems. These three
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new metrics are: timed automata arc coverage metric(ACM), back-and-forth region
coverage metric(RCM)[25], and triggering condition coverage metric(TCM). ACM
is a straightforward adaptation from the technology of VLSI simulation, whereas
RCM and TCM are not. For dense-time systems, RCM and TCM are more precise
in the estimation of coverage by considering state-space coverage. We shall prove in
a lemma that RCM has enough power to discern reachable risk states while ACM
lacks sufficient power. To maintain the four criteria for dense-time state-spaces of
real-time systems, we have developed techniques to quantitatively estimate the vol-
ume of a state-space, and to significantly prune irrelevant state-space portions from
a verification task.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our techniques for real-world projects, in sec-
tion 8, we have modeled and verified the Logical Link Control and Adaptation Layer
Protocol(L2CAP) of Bluetooth specification[16]. Bluetooth is a widely adopted
wireless communication standard in the industry. We model two devices that
communicate with the Bluetooth L2CAP and carry out simulation experiments to
gather data on numerical coverage estimation. We then compare the three coverage
metrics with respect to our experiment data and the four criteria.
In section 2, we review related works. In section 3, we briefly present our verifi-
cation framework with timed automata. In section 4, we discuss the four criteria for
effective coverage metrics. In sections 5 through 7, we present our three coverage
metrics and their estimation procedures. Finally, in section 8, we report on our
experiment results with the Bluetooth L2CAP and discuss the implications of the
experiment data.
2 Previous work
Coverage techniques have been widely discussed and applied in testing, simulation
and formal verification of various system designs. In software testing, people use
control flowgraphs [5], which are composed of processes, decisions, and junctions.
Given a set of program stimuli, one can determine the statements activated by
the stimuli with the coverage metrics of the flowgraphs. Programming code met-
rics measure syntactical characteristics of a code w.r.t its execution stimuli. For
example, line coverage metric measures the number of distinct statements visited
during the course of execution, branch coverage measures the number of distinct
branch decisions, and path coverage measures the number of distinct paths (i.e. a
unique combination of branch decisions and statements) exercised due to its exe-
cution stimuli[6]. The number of paths in a program may be exponentially related
to program size which greatly hinders attaining 100% path coverage in software
testing.
Coverage analysis techniques proposed for general HDL programs include: guar-
anteed coverage of every statement[9], transition coverage of a test set[20], and
abstraction of models and semantic control over transition coverage[15]. Fallah
provides OCCOM[14] to address the observability issue. Most of these HDL met-
rics are used to drive test-generation in simulation analysis.
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Ho et al.[21] proposed a coverage metric to estimate the ”completeness” of a set
of properties verified in model-checking FSM against a subset of CTL. A symbolic
algorithm is also presented. Chockler et al.[10] also suggested several coverage
metrics to measure completeness of a verified specification, and to find uncovered
parts.
Dill proposed a way to bridge the gap between simulation and formal verification[13].
Generator of Test Cases for Hardware Architecture(GOTCHA) is a prototype coverage-
driven test generator implemented as an extension to the Murφ model-checker[23].
It supports state and transition coverage analysis in FSM. On completion of the
entire reachable state-space enumeration, a random coverage task is chosen from
those not yet covered.
Opposed to previous works with untimed or discrete-time systems, we apply
coverage techniques in our symbolic simulator with dense-time model. One difficulty
arises in the design of meaningful metrics to estimate state-spaces which are both
dense and infinite. Traditional state and transition coverage metrics for untimed or
discrete-time systems cannot be directly copied since metrics may always be zero
based on the dense domain.
3 Framework of verification
3.1 System model
We use the widely accepted model of timed automata (TA)[2]. As we assume fa-
miliarity with this model, we will not go into much detail. A TA is a finite-state
automaton equipped with a finite set of clocks which can hold nonnegative real-
values. A TA can stay in only one mode (or control location) at a time. In oper-
ation, one transition can be triggered when its corresponding triggering condition
is satisfied. Upon being triggered, the TA instantaneously transits from one mode
to another and resets some clocks to zero. Between transitions, all clocks increase
their readings at a uniform rate.
For convenience, given a set Q of modes and a set X of clocks, we use B(Q,X)
as the set of all Boolean combinations of mode predicate mode = q, where mode is
a special auxiliary variable, and inequalities of the forms x − x′ ∼ c, where q ∈ Q,
x, x′ ∈ X ∪ {0}, “∼” is one of ≤, <,=, >,≥, and c is an integer constant.
Definition 1 timed automata (TA): A timed automaton A is given as a tuple
〈X,Q, I, µ, T, τ, π〉 with the following restrictions: X is the set of clocks, Q is the set
of modes, I ∈ B(Q,X) is the initial condition on clocks, µ : Q 7→ B(∅, X) defines
the invariance condition of each mode, T ⊆ Q × Q is the set of transitions, and
τ : T 7→ B(∅, X) and π : T 7→ 2X respectively define the triggering condition and
the clock set to reset of each transition. ‖
A valuation of a set is a mapping from that set to another set. Given an η ∈
B(Q,X) and a valuation ν of X , we say ν satisfies η, in symbols ν |= η, iff η will
be evaluated true when the variables in η are interpreted according to ν.
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Definition 2 states: A state ν of A = 〈X,Q, I, µ, T, τ, π〉 is a valuation of X ∪
{mode} such that
• ν(mode) ∈ Q is the mode of A in ν; and
• for each x ∈ X , ν(x) ∈ R+ such that R+ is the set of nonnegative real
numbers and ν |= µ(ν(mode)). ‖
For any t ∈ R+, ν + t is a state identical to ν except that for every clock x ∈ X ,
ν(x) + t = (ν + t)(x). Given X¯ ⊆ X , νX¯ is a new state identical to ν except that
for every x ∈ X¯ , νX¯(x) = 0.
Definition 3 runs: Given a timed automaton A = 〈X,Q, I, µ, T, τ, π〉, a run is an
infinite sequence of state-time pairs (ν0, t0)(ν1, t1) . . . (νk, tk) . . . such that ν0 |= I
and t0t1 . . . tk . . . is a monotonically increasing real-number (time) divergent se-
quence, and for all k ≥ 0,
• for all t ∈ [0, tk+1 − tk], νk + t |= µ(νk(mode)); and
• either νk(mode) = νk+1(mode) and νk + (tk+1 − tk) = νk+1; or
− (νk(mode), νk+1(mode)) ∈ T and
− νk + (tk+1 − tk) |= τ(νk(mode), νk+1(mode)) and
− (νk + (tk+1 − tk))π(νk(mode), νk+1(mode)) = νk+1. ‖
3.2 Procedure of simulation and coverage analysis
We adopt the safety-analysis problem as our verification framework for simplic-
ity. In this framework, we want to check whether an unsafe state can be reached
by repetitive generation of symbolic traces. Formally speaking, a safety analy-
sis problem instance consists of a timed automaton A and a safety state-predicate
η ∈ B(Q,X). A is safe with respect to η, in symbols A |= η, iff for all runs
(ν0, t0)(ν1, t1) . . . (νk, tk) . . . . . ., for all k ≥ 0, and for all t ∈ [0, tk+1− tk], νk+ t |= η,
i.e., the safety requirement is guaranteed.
We construct our main procedure based on the well-discussed symbolic proce-
dure, called next(), to compute a symbolic post-condition after a discrete transition
and time-progress[17, 22]. Our symbolic simulation procedure takes the following
form (details on coverage estimation in statements (1) and (4) will be explained in
sections 5 through 7).
Symbolic Simulate(A, η) /* A is a TA; η is the safety state predicate. */ {
Compute the numerical estimation f of the whole target function F . (1)
Let φ := I; φ′ := false; v := 0;
While (true) {
Let φ′ := φ;
Select a subspace ψ of φ and a set T¯ of transitions
(possibly based on the value φ and T¯ ); (2)
Compute φ := φ ∨
∨
e∈T¯ next(A,ψ, e); (3)
Compute the estimation v of the verified proportion V
of the whole target function; (4)
Print v/f as the new numerical coverage estimation. (5)
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If φ ∧ ¬η 6= ∅,
print out ”a risk state is reachable” and exit;
else if v/f ≥ threshold,
print out ”The threshold of the chosen coverage metric is reached” and exit;
else φ = φ′
print out ”no risk states are found” and exit; (6)
}
}
In this manuscript, we use the term ”portion” to mean a basic unit of the target
function in the estimation of trace coverage. Formally speaking, given a coverage
metric, a portion is an equivalence class of (syntactic or semantic) entities of the
target function in which two entities cannot be distinguished by the given coverage
metric. The target function is conceptually defined as the set of all portions. Cover-
age means that how much of the target function has appeared in a set of simulation
traces.
In the case of line coverage, a portion is a statement line. For state-coverage, a
portion is a concrete state of the verification target. We can also use regions as the
portion in the simulation of dense-time systems. In this case, a portion can contain
infinitely many concrete states.
The target function can be the set of TA transitions (arcs), the regions of whole
reachable state-space, or the regions of the triggering-conditions of all transitions
in this paper.
In statement (2), we allow for the selection flexibility of various search strate-
gies. Indeed, we have already implemented game-based, goal-oriented, and random
strategies [31]. A subspace ψ of the verified state-space φ and a set T¯ of selected
transitions are fed to procedure next() to compute the new next-step state-space
after transitions and time-progress in statement (3). In statement (5), the coverage
is numerically estimated as the ratio of the already-verified proportion of the whole
target function. The infinite loop can continue until a risk state is reached, or un-
til we feel that enough confidence has been established (coverage of the function
has reached some specific threshold), or until we have reached the fixed point and
finished the exhaustive search in statement (6).
However, our simulation framework is actually more general than simulation. For
example, if in every iteration, we choose ψ = φ and T¯ = T in statement (2), the
whole procedure becomes a forward reachability analyzer. In the next few sections,
we will discuss how to compute coverage estimations according to our three coverage
metrics. As for the use of various strategies to guide searches, we believe it deserves
more effort in the future.
4 Criteria for good coverage metrics
A good coverage estimation should tell us what proportion of a target function
has been covered. We can partition a target function into portions and use an
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estimation function ǫ()(from the set of portions to the set of nonnegative reals)
to numerically estimate coverage. Formally speaking, ǫ : F 7→ R+ where R+ is
the set of nonnegative reals. The whole target function can then be estimated as
f =
∑
p∈F ǫ(p), and the current covered proportion V of the target function, i.e.
the verified subset of F , can be estimated as v =
∑
p∈V ǫ(p). In ACM, a portion
represents a physical entity (i.e. a transition) of the automata, then coverage of
that portion means that the physical entity has been used in some traces. In RCM
and TCM, a portion represents a state subspace(i.e. a region), then the occurrence
of any state in the portion along some simulation traces indicates the portion has
been covered.
In practice, it can be difficult to design a good metric for dense-time systems.
For example, we may want to use visited states as portions. Then in a dense-time
state-space, we have to decide how a state should correspond to a portion. For dis-
cernment, a natural choice of a portion is the region presented in [2]. But it is very
expensive (PSPACE-complete) to compute a precise representation of the entire
reachable region set. A naive solution to this challenge is to use symbolic tech-
niques with the popular data-structure of DBM (difference-bounded matrix)[12].
The challenge is that DBMs are not necessarily disjointed from one another. If we
sum up portion estimations of each state-space using a DBM to calculate the total
estimation, it is likely that some portions will be counted more than once.
After experimenting with various coverage metrics and their computation meth-
ods, we have identified the following four criteria for effective numerical coverage
metrics.
• accountability: This assures that each portion of the target function is
accounted for once and only once. If accountability is not maintained, we
may run into the two following bizarre situations. First, some portions may
not be accounted for and thus engineers simply cannot trust the metrics to
check if all function portions have been covered. Second, it may happen that
some portions are counted more than once and thus full coverage estimation
is greater than 100% which makes no sense at all. Thus, accountability is the
most important criterion. If we are going to use state-space or its abstraction
to estimate coverage of target functions in dense-time systems, then we must
develop new techniques, other than DBMs, to assure each portion is accounted
for exactly once.
• coverability: This means that
∑
p∈V ǫ(p) =
∑
p∈F ǫ(p) can be expected at
the end of a symbolic simulation if enough traces have been generated. This
is desirable in that 100% coverage can be the goal for verification. Moreover,
if engineers decide to stop verification at 80% coverage, they can roughly esti-
mate confidence in their products. It is likely to stump verification engineers
if the coverage estimation converges at a small percentage number, no mat-
ter how many traces they have generated. One-hundred percent coverage can
only be achieved if we have a precise numerical estimation of the entired target
function F to be verified.
• efficiency: This criterion measures the overhead in the computation of both
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the f (at statement (1)) and the v (at statement (4)) in procedure Symbolic Simulate().
If complex formal reachability analysis is used to compute these two estima-
tions, it is not worthwhile to estimate the coverage. In this work, we base
our coverage estimation on transition-countings and state-space abstraction
techniques and can efficiently calculate estimations in our three metrics.
• discernment: This criterion assesses the capability of a metric to discern
risk states. This can be an issue when, in some metrics, risk states and non-
risk states are likely to fall in the same portion. A metric that frequently
fails to detect existing risk states at a high numerical coverage may give users
unjustified and false confidence on their system designs.
The third and fourth criteria are kind of contradictory to each other. In a lot
of cases, in order to discern risk states, we not only have to partition the portions
intelligently, but we also have to partition them in great resolution. And this usually
results in high complexity and low efficiency to reach high coverage with enough
traces through the huge space of portions.
In the following, we shall use these four criteria to evaluate the coverage metrics
presented in the next few sections.
5 TA arc coverage metric (ACM)
This is a straightforward adaptation from the technology of VLSI simulation and
testing. In the computation of FSM arc coverage for VLSI, we conceptually trans-
form a circuit to a finite-state automaton (FSM) and use the set of already-triggered
transitions as V and the set of executable transitions as F to compute coverage
estimation[6, 25]. The same definition of FSM arc coverage can readily be copied
for the simulation of timed automata (TA). That is, we can also use the arcs of
TAs to estimate coverage in the TA arc coverage metric (ACM). The straightfor-
wardness of this metric has many desirable features. Each portion corresponds to
an executable transition and the estimation function ǫACM () maps everything to
1. The numerical estimation f of the whole target function in statement (1) of
procedure Symbolic Simulate() can be |T |, the number of transitions in the TA.
But it can be much tighter and more precise. In our implementation, we actually
compute an untimed quotient structure of A’s state-space through forward analysis
and eliminate those transitions that are actually not triggerible. In this way, we
usually come up with a much smaller bound on f , which is the number of executable
transitions in ACM.
As for the computation of the numerical coverage estimation v, we use V as a
static set variable of transitions such that V = ∅ initially. Each time when statement
(4) in procedure Symbolic Simulate() is executed, we perform the following two
steps.
V := V ∪ T¯ ; v := |V |;
LEMMA 1 ACM for dense-time systems satisfies the accountability criterion.
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Proof : It is true since ǫACM (e) = 1 for every executable transition in F , and we
directly use the sizes of already-triggered and executable transition sets to calcualte
the coverage. ‖
The criterion of full coverability is not guaranteed. But as can be seen from
our experiment data in section 8, with a tight estimation of the set of executable
transitions, it is possible to get very close to 100% of coverage. As for the criterion
of efficiency, in each iteration, the overhead is a set-union operation and a size
calculation of set and the efficiency is high. Finally, ACM may not have much
discernment since a transition can very often be used in both a safe trace and a
trace that ends in a risk state. This means ACM may reach 100% coverage without
discovering the risk state even if it exists.
6 Back-and-forth region coverage metric (RCM)
ACM can very often be too coarse to discern risk states. Another extreme that
can also be adapted from VLSI verification technology is the visited-state coverage
metric[6, 25], which uses the reachable state set in FSM to estimate coverage. The
challenge to incorporate the concept into our framework arises from the fact that
in VLSI’s model, the states are discrete and countable while in timed automata,
the states are dense and uncountable. A solution is to use equivalence classes in
the dense-time state-space as portions. An equivalence relation to partition dense-
time state-space is the region-equivalence relation between states[2]. In this paper,
a region is a minimal state-space characterizable by a mode and clock-difference
constraints in the form of x− x′ ∼ c where x, x′ are two dense-time clocks, ∼∈ {<
,≤,=,≥, >}, and c is an integer in the range of [−CA:η, CA:η] where CA:η is the
biggest timing constant used in A and the safety state predicate η. In this way,
we consider in this section the concept of region coverage metric (RCM), in which
a basic portion is a region, for the simulation of real-time systems. This coverage
metric can have extra leverage with symbolic simulation since, in one step, we
may generate a huge proportion of the state-space represented by a set of symbolic
constraints.
There are three challenges in the implementation of RCM. First, how do we con-
struct a tight estimation relevant to the reachability of the states? Second, how
do we compute the coverage estimations of sets of portions, i.e.
∑
p∈V ǫRCM (p)
and
∑
p∈F ǫRCM (p)? Third, how do we maintain the accountability of the met-
rics? In this section, we counter these three challenges in three steps. For the
first challenge, we use the intersection of abstractions of both backward and for-
ward reachable state-space representations to construct a tight estimation of the
whole target function (i.e., the whole reachable region set in RCM). For the second
challenge, we work on the level of zones. A zone is a set of regions whose state-
spaces are characterizable by a set of clock difference constraints. We then develop
a procedure to calculate the region coverage estimation of a zone in the state-space.
Our estimation is efficient, because we adopt the concept of region to partition the
dense state-space and use CDD(Clock-Difference Diagram)[7] as our data structure.
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Many model-checkers for TAs are built around the central manipulation procedures
of zones[1, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32]. Finally, for the third challenge, we present a data-
structure and show that the data-structure can represent a state-space as a set
of disjointed zones. With this data-structure, we can estimate the coverage of a
state-space as the sum of coverages of a set of disjointed zones.
6.1 Tight estimation of the target function
In general, it is very expensive to compute representations for the exact reachable
state-spaces. In our previous implementations, we use abstractions of either the
backward or the forward reachable state-spaces to compute the estimation for the
whole target function in RCM. But such estimations seem very imprecise. In some
experiments, the final coverage estimations, when the whole reachable state-space
representations have been constructed, fall in the range of 10−5. Moreover, much
proportion of the reachable state-space seems irrelevant to the reachability from
initial states to risk states.
We have observed that to analyze this reachability, we only have to trace through
those states which are both backward reachable from a risk state and forward reach-
able from an initial state. So we use the following steps to compute an estimation
of the whole target function.
Compute F as the untimed quotient structure
of the state-space of A from initial states.
Compute B as the magnitude quotient structure
of the backward reachable state-space of A from risk states in ¬η.
Let F := F ∧ B;
In the second statement, we employ an abstraction technique, called magnitude
abstraction, to compute the weakest preconditions from a state-predicate. A mag-
nitude abstraction of a state-predicate eliminates from the state-predicate all clock
inequalities like x− x′ ∼ c where x, x′ are not zeros.
With these three steps, we have constrained F to a much smaller state-space that
is relevant to the reachability from initial states to risk states. Notice that these
steps should not be regarded as extraneous expenses for RCM, since our symbolic
simulator will initially take these steps to shrink the state-space that we have to
search during the simulation anyway. According to our experiments reported in
section 8, this technique has brought our ultimate estimation in RCM very close to
100% and resulted in much better coverability.
6.2 Coverage estimation of a zone
A zone is a state-space characterizable by a range constraints on the mode variable
and a set of range constraints on the clock differences. Conveniently speaking, the
characterization can be represented as a pair like (Q′,K) such that
• Q′ ⊆ Q and is the range of the mode variable; and
10
• K is a set of range constraints like c ∼ x−x′ ∼′ c′ for clock differences, where
∼,∼′∈ {<,≤} and c, c′ ∈ [−CA:η, CA:η] ∪ {−∞,∞}.
For the efficiency of coverage estimation, we intuitively compute something like a
normalized volume estimation of zones. The volume estimation of a rectangular
polyhedron in a multi-dimensional space can be computed as the multiplication
of its length in each dimension. For efficiency, we intuitively interpret a zone as
a rectangular polyhedron in a space of 1 + |X |(1 + |X |) dimensions. The range of
variable mode’s value spans the first dimension while xi−xj , for each xi, xj ∈ X∪{0}
with i < j, spans a dimension. This intuitive and simplistic interpretation of zones
neglects the fact that constraints on clock differences are not independent of one
another. But our experiments show that it helps us design an efficient and coverable
metric for region coverage.
In measuring the length of a clock difference constraint, we partition the real
number lines into the following 4CA:η + 3 basic intervals
(−∞,−CA:η)[−CA:η ,−CA:η ] . . . [−1,−1](−1, 0)[0, 0](0, 1)[1, 1](1, 2) . . . [CA:η, CA:η ](CA:η ,∞)
and use the number of basic intervals covered by the clock difference constraint for
the estimated length. For example, −3 ≤ x−x′ < 2 has length 10 because it covers
[−3,−3], (−3,−2), . . . , [1, 1], (1, 2).
Such volume estimations can result in huge numbers not representable by integers
in computers’ hardware. Thus instead of using the absolute length in each dimension
to compute the estimated volume, we choose to use the normalized lengths (i.e. the
floating point numbers of the length divided by the maximum length of the difference
variables). The normalized length for Q′ is thus |Q′|/|Q|. The normalized length
for a clock difference constraint is broken down to the following eight cases:
• (2(c′ − c) + 1)/(4CA:η + 3) for c ≤ x− x′ ≤ c′ with c ≥ −CA:η and c′ ≤ CA:η,
• (2(c′ − c))/(4CA:η + 3) for either c < x − x′ ≤ c′ or c ≤ x − x′ < c′ with
c ≥ −CA:η and c′ ≤ CA:η,
• (2(c′ − c)− 1)/(4CA:η + 3) for c < x− x′ < c′ with c ≥ −CA:η and c′ ≤ CA:η,
• (2(c′ + CA:η) + 2)/(4CA:η + 3) for −∞ < x− x′ ≤ c′ with c′ ≤ CA:η,
• (2(c′ + CA:η) + 1)/(4CA:η + 3) for −∞ < x− x′ < c′ with c′ ≤ CA:η,
• (2(CA:η − c) + 2)/(4CA:η + 3) for c ≤ x1 − x′1 <∞ with c ≥ −CA:η,
• (2(CA:η − c) + 1)/(4CA:η + 3) for c < x1 − x
′
1 <∞ with c ≥ −CA:η,
• 1 for −∞ < x1 − x
′
1 <∞; /* this case is usually not represented in zones */
Accordingly, the estimated normalized volume of a zone (Q′,K) is
|Q′|
|Q| ·Π”c∼x−x′∼′c′”∈K(the normalized length of c ≤ x− x
′ ≤ c′)
6.3 Coverage estimation as a set of disjointed zones
Although the technique in the last subsection allows us to come up with a coverage
estimation of a zone, the zones may intersect with one another and accountability
may not be maintained. In this subsection, we present a representation for dense-
time state-spaces such that zones represented are disjointed from one another. The
representation that we have found with this property is CDD[7] with all zones
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0− x2
[−1,∞)
0− x2
0− x1
(−∞,−3] (−3,∞)
x1 − x2
x1 − x3
(−∞,−1)
(−∞,−1)
(−∞, 6)
(4,∞)
Figure 1: CDD for (0 − x1 ≤ −3 ∧ x1 − x3 < −4 ∧ x2 − x1 < 6) ∨ (0− x2 < −1 ∧ x2 − x1 < 6)
in their closure forms (or all-pair shortest-path form). CDD is a BDD-like data-
structure whose variables are clock differences like x− x′ and whose outgoing arcs
from variables are disjointed value ranges. For example, the CDD for the state-
space of (0− x1 ≤ −3∧ x1 − x3 < −4∧ x2 − x1 < 6) ∨ (0− x2 < −1∧ x2 − x1 < 6)
without terminal false is in figure 1. Each path in this figure represents a zone in
closure form. We refer interested readers to [7] for the definition and manipulations
of CDD.
We can prove the following lemma.
LEMMA 2 Given a CDD with all zones in their closure forms, then each two
paths in the CDD represent two disjointed zones.
Proof : From root to the terminals of the two paths, there is a branching node
from which the two paths break away. The corresponding outgoing arcs from the
node for the two paths are labeled with disjointed intervals. With the tightness of
the zone constraints, this means that the zones of the two paths are disjointed. ‖
In our implementation, we follow the approach in [7] that a set of zones are
first normalized to their closure forms before being stored in a CDD. Thus, for the
convenience of presentation, we can assume that a CDD, say D, is represented as a
true, or a false, or a tuple like D = (x− x′, (λ1, D1), . . . , (λn, Dn)), such that
• the root node of D is labeled with clock difference variable x− x′.
• λ1, . . . , λn are disjointed intervals whose endpoints are in {−∞,−CA:η, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , CA:η,∞}.
• for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the arc labeled with interval λi points to Di.
With the desirable feature of CDD, we can design the following symbolic procedure
to compute the estimated volume of a state-space represented by CDD with all
zones in closure forms.
normalized volume(D) /* D is true, false, or (x− x′, (λ1, D1), . . . , (λn, Dn)) */ {
if D is true, return 1; else if D is false, return 0;
else if D is (x− x′, (λ1, D1), . . . , (λn, Dn)), then
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return
∑
1≤i≤n
the number of basic intervals covered by λi
4CA:η+3
normalized volume(Di);
}
Another advantage of this symbolic procedure is that we can take advantage of
the data-sharing in CDD to avoid explicit enumeration of all disjointed zones. The
normalized volume estimation of a substructure in a CDD can be saved and used
for the estimation of other zones that use this same substructure.
6.4 Estimation of the region coverage
In our framework, both V and F in Symbolic Simulate() on page 5 are conceptually
represented as a set of pairs like (Q′, D), for a state-space, where D is a CDD with
all zones in closure form, with the following constraints.
• For each two pairs (Q′1, D1), (Q
′
2, D2) in the set, Q
′
1 ∩Q
′
2 = ∅.
• For each pair (Q′, D) in the set, D represents the zones of all states with their
modes in Q′.
The procedure to transform a state-space representation in BDDs and DBMs to this
representation can be found in [7]. Then at statement (4) of each iteration of pro-
cedure Symbolic Simulate() on page 5, the estimated normalized volume v for V is
∑
(Q′,D)∈V
|Q′|
|Q| · normalized volume(D) and
v
f
=
∑
(Q′,D)∈V
|Q′|
|Q|
·normalized volume(D)
∑
(Q′,D)∈F
|Q′|
|Q|
·normalized volume(D)
.
LEMMA 3 RCM satisfies the criterion of accountability.
Proof : According to lemma 2, zones respectively represented by paths in a CDD
in its closure form are disjointed from one another. Thus in the algorithm of
normalized volume(), we count each portion once and only once and RCM sat-
isfies the criterion of accountability. ‖
LEMMA 4 RCM satisifies the criterion of discernment, and it is impossible to
reach 100% coverage without detecting the risk state, if any.
Proof : Given a timed automaton A and a risk predicate η, in RCM, safe states and
unsafe states are not in the same portion. This is because symbolic manipulations
of zones are sufficient to answer the reachability problem of timed automata[2]. ‖
According to lemma 4, RCM has enough discerning power to discover reachable
risk states whereas ACM lacks such discerning power.
7 Triggering-condition coverage metric (TCM)
RCM has the advantage in accountability and discernment. But it may result in low
coverability since our estimation of the reachable region sets can be imprecise. On
the other hand, ACM can suffer from low discernment. In this section, we propose
a balanced approach called triggering-condition coverage metric (TCM), in which
we use the triggering conditions of all transitions as the body of the whole target
function. TCM estimates the proportion of the covered triggering conditions of
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all transitions. It is accounted as the summation of triggering condition coverage
for each transition. Formally speaking, a basic portion in TCM is a pair like (e, γ)
where e is an executable transition and γ is a region in subspace τ(e) (the triggering
condition of e).
The numerical estimation f of the whole target function in procedure Symbolic Simulate()
can be computed as
∑
e∈T normalized volume(τ(e)), where τ(e) is the triggering
condition of each e ∈ T . We use |T | variables, Ve for each e ∈ T , to record the
verified proportion of the triggering condition of each transition. Initially, for all
e ∈ T , Ve = false. At each iteration’s execution of statement (4), we execute the
following steps to compute the value v.
for each e ∈ T¯ , Ve := Ve ∨ (abstracte(φ ∧ τ(e)));
let v :=
∑
e∈T normalized volume(Ve);
Here for the sake of efficiency, we use an abstract function abstracte(d) to elim-
inate the recording of all clock difference variables not used in τ(e). For example, if
τ(e) = 0−x < −5∧x−y ≤ 3, then abstracte(0−x < −7∧x−y ≤ −2∧y−0 ≤ 2) =
0− x < −7∧ x− y ≤ −2 and the constraint literal y− 0 ≤ 2 is filtered out since no
constraint on difference y − 0 is used in the triggering condition of e. Also in these
two steps, we assume that while invoking normalized volume(Ve) for each e, Ve
has already been transformed to the representation like {(Q′1, D1), . . . , (Q
′
n, Dn)}.
It can be shown that TCM has the following desirable property.
LEMMA 5 TCM satisfies the criterion of accountability.
Proof : We calculate the normalized volume of zones based on the triggering con-
ditions of transitions with TCM. Since zones of the triggering conditions of each
transition represented by a CDD are disjointed, TCM satisfies the criterion of ac-
countability. ‖
TCM is more efficient than the RCM since it is based on abstraction of zones
whose representation complexity is usually lower. In the following experiments, we
shall see that it satisfies the criterion of coverability without sacrificing its discern-
ment.
8 Experiments with Bluetooth L2CAP
We have implemented our numerical coverage estimation techniques in our model-
checker/simulator red 4.1. The input language of red is a set of communicating
timed automata (CTA) that communicate with one another through CSP-style syn-
chronization channels[18]. For each channel σ, two processes have to execute at
the same instant to achieve a synchronization through the channel. In the synchro-
nization instant, one process executes a transition with event !σ for output and the
other executes a transition with event ?σ for input.
To check the possibility of using our techniques in real-world projects, we have
experimented with the Logical Link Control and Adaptation Layer Protocol(L2CAP)
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of Bluetooth specification[16]. The wireless communication standard of Bluetooth
has been widely discussed and adopted in many appliances since it was published.
L2CAP is layered over the Baseband Protocol and resides in the data link layer
of Bluetooth. This protocol supports message multiplexing, packet segmentation
and reassembly, and the conveying of quality of service information to the upper
protocol layer. The protocol regulates the behavior between a master device and a
slave device.
In our experiment, we collect coverage and performance data for L2CAP models
both with and without design faults against various trace-generation strategies. In
subsection 8.2, we report the coverage data of ACM, RCM, and TCM for the L2CAP
model without faults. In subsection 8.3, we create six versions of the L2CAP model,
each with an inserted fault, and report how the coverage metrics help us discern
the faults before 100% coverage is reached. In appendix D, more coverage and
performance data of our experiments with various trace-generation strategies can
be found. Data is collected on a Pentium 4 with 1.7GHz, 256MB, running Red Hat
Linux 7.0.
8.1 Modelling L2CAP
The L2CAP defines the actions performed by a master and a slave. A master is a
device issuing a request while a slave is the one responding to the master’s request.
A message sequence chart (MSC) that may better illustrate a typical scenario of
event sequence in L2CAP can be found in appendix A. The scenario starts when the
master’s upper layer issues an L2CA ConnectReq (Connection Request) through the
L2CA interface. Upon receiving the request, the master communicates the request
through the unreliable network to the slave (with an L2CAP ConnectReq), which
will then convey the request to the slave’s upper layer (with an L2CA ConnectInd).
The protocol goes on with messages bouncing back and forth until the master
sends an L2CAP ConfigRsp message to the slave. Then both parties can start ex-
changing data. Finally the master’s upper layer issues message L2CA DisconnectReq
to close the connection and the slave confirms the disconnection.
We use nine processes to model the entire activity in L2CAP. They are the
master’s upper layer, the master’s L2CAP layer, master’s L2CAP time-out process,
master’s L2CAP extended time-out process, the slave’s upper layer, the slave’s
L2CAP layer, slave’s L2CAP time-out process, slave’s L2CAP extended time-out
process, and the unreliable network. Each of these processes is described as a
communicating timed automaton. The CTA for both the master and the slave can
be found in appendix B. The safety condition is that when the master’s L2CAP
layer stays in the OPEN state, the slave’s L2CAP layer can not enter the state
W4 L2CA DISCONNECT RSP.
8.2 Coverage estimation when there is no fault
In this subsection, we execute procedure Symbolic Simulate() with breadth-first
strategy to verify our L2CAP model without faults. That is, each time we execute
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iteration ACM ACM time RCM RCM time TCM TCM time
overhead overhead overhead
1 4/97 0.00sec. 0.167816 7.39sec. 0.004092 0.02sec.
2 8/97 0.00sec. 0.173442 7.39sec. 0.382901 0.02sec.
3 12/97 0.00sec. 0.174279 7.40sec. 0.783131 0.02sec.
4 20/97 0.01sec. 0.175273 7.41sec. 0.799498 0.02sec.
5 36/97 0.02sec. 0.232154 7.41sec. 0.813138 0.03sec.
6 42/97 0.03sec. 0.295386 7.41sec. 0.815525 0.04sec.
7 64/97 0.05sec. 0.408160 7.42sec. 0.884971 0.06sec.
8 76/97 0.08sec. 0.561395 7.43sec. 0.920890 0.08sec.
9 88/97 0.12sec. 0.956820 7.44sec. 0.971241 0.11sec.
10 94/97 0.17sec. 0.965724 7.45sec. 0.975507 0.15sec.
11 94/97 0.22sec. 0.974428 7.46sec. 0.975507 0.18sec.
12 95/97 0.28sec. 0.975538 7.48sec. 0.976530 0.22sec.
13 97/97 0.34sec. 0.975783 7.49sec. 1.000000 0.26sec.
14 97/97 0.40sec. 0.981319 7.50sec. 1.000000 0.29sec.
15 97/97 0.47sec. 0.981338 7.52sec. 1.000000 0.33sec.
16 97/97 0.55sec. 0.982733 7.54sec. 1.000000 0.36sec.
17 97/97 0.63sec. 0.982734 7.56sec. 1.000000 0.40sec.
18 97/97 0.70sec. 0.982734 7.57sec. 1.000000 0.44sec.
Table 1: Coverage estimations and overheads with respect to iterations when there
are no bugs
statement (2) in procedure Symbolic Simulate(), we let T¯ = T and φ = ψ.
In each iteration, we calculate three estimations according to the three coverage
metrics respectively. The data is in table 8.2. After 18 iterations, red 4.1 finishes
the exhaustive search, and reports that the risk state is NOT reachable. It costs
total cpu time 37.14 sec and memory usage 782k with ACM; total cpu time 30.59
sec and memory usage 632k with RCM; total CPU time 35.79 sec and memory
usage 722k with TCM.
ACM and TCM can both reach 100% coverage estimation while RCM gets very
close to 100%. The data shows that our methods have very high coverability in the
experiment.
Another interesting thing is that for this correct L2CAP model, ACM and TCM
can give us 100% confidence in their respective metrics before the whole reachable
state-space representation is constructed. More precisely, according to ACM and
TCM, we can stop at iteration 13 with 100% confidence. On the other hand, if we use
straightforward formal verification, then we have to run through all the 18 iterations
before we can conclude that the model is fault-free. This observation suggests that
symbolic simulation with our coverage metrics can greatly save verification costs.
Since RCM gets us very close to 100% coverage, we can use 100% coverage as
a goal for verification in RCM. More importantly, RCM is a better alternative in
discernment than ACM and TCM. For one thing, at the 17th iteration, it could
still increase to reflect more portions that have been traced through while ACM
and TCM have already converged to 1.
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Figure 2: Growth of coverage with respect to iterations in ACM
As for the efficiency of our coverage estimation methods, we find that at the end
of the state-space construction, the overhead incurred in the coverage estimation
respectively for ACM, RCM and TCM is about 0.70, 7.57 and 0.44 seconds. Com-
pared with the verification time, we find that for ACM, only 0.70/37.14 ≈ 0.01885 =
1.885% of the verification CPU time is used in the coverage estimation. For TCM,
only 0.44/35.79 ≈ 0.01229 = 1.229% of the verification CPU time is used. This
means that our implementation for both ACM and TCM are quite efficient. In
figure 2 and figure 3, we drew the growth of coverage in ACM and TCM for the
correct model and the six faulty models (details in the next subsection) with respect
to the iterations. Notice that both coverage metrics grow quickly between the 4th
iteration and the 10th iteration and then become flattened out to convergy to 100%.
It reaches 100% at the 13th iteration and finishes the exhaustive search at the 18th
iteration in the correct case. In the all faulty models we reach the risk state before
the 11th iteration. The patterns show that both metrics may give engineers enough
confidence to make decision quickly. For example, they may stop the simulation
while the coverage becomes 100% or whilr it starts to converge 100%, and save the
verification resources.
For RCM, 7.57/30.59 ≈ 0.24747 = 24.747% of the verification CPU time is used
in the coverage estimation. A detail breakdown of the computation time shows that
most of the overhead is consumed in the normalized volume calculation with the
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Figure 3: Growth of coverage with respect to iterations in TCM
much larger CDD structure. This is the price of better discernment.
Figures 4 shows the growth of coverage in RCM for the same models. It’s inter-
esting that the patterns dramatically increase in the first few iterations and then
slow down in the next ierations. We can also detect the faults before the 11th iter-
ation while the coverage in the correct model stops increasing in the 17th iteration
and finishes the exhaustive search at iteration 18. Although RCM could not satisfy
the coverability, we can figure out the end point while it stops increasing.
8.3 Coverage estimation when there is a fault
We design six L2CAP faulty models, each with an inserted fault. For convenience,
we label these six faulty models with indices 1 through 6. In each faulty model, we
change master or slave’s behaviors and let the risk condition become reachable. The
description of the six faulty models are given in appendix C. We tried two trace-
generation strategies. The first is breadth-first (see subsection 8.2). The second is
depth-first. That is, at each time when we execute statement (2), we choose T¯ to
be of size 1 and only choose to fire one transition in T . We also keep a stack so
that we can backtrack to previous iterations to choose an alternative transitions at
statement (2). The coverage data is shown in table 2. The most interesting thing
in table 2 is that the faults are all detected before we reach 100% coverage. This
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Figure 4: Growth of coverage with respect to iterations in RCM
means that our three coverage metrics have enough discernment for the six faulty
models.
9 Conclusion
Symbolic simulation combines the advantages of both simulation and formal verifi-
cation and can be an important verification approach before fully automatic formal
verification becomes applicable. In this paper, we present techniques for coverage
estimation for dense-time systems. We hope such techniques can be the solid step-
stone toward the development of powerful symbolic simulators for industry real-time
systems. Many issues raised in this work also deserve future research. For example,
it will be interesting to see the design of quantitative metrics for our criterion of
discernment in the symbolic simulation of dense-time systems. With such metrics,
the criterion becomes equivalent to the notion of observability[11].
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APPENDICES
A Message sequence chart for Bluetooth L2CAP
L2CAP layer Upper layer L2CAP layer Upper layer
L2CA_ConfigCfm
DATA
L2CA_DisconnectReq L2CA_DisconnectInd
L2CA_ConnectCfm
L2CA_ConfigReq L2CA_ConfigInd
L2CA_ConfigRsp
L2CA_ConfigReqL2CA_ConfigInd
DATA
L2CA_ConfigRsp
L2CA_ConfigCfm
L2CA_DisconnectRspL2CA_DisconnectCfm
L2CAP_DATA_ENDL2CA_DATA_END
L2CA_ConnectReq
L2CA_ConnectReq L2CAP_ConnectReq L2CA_ConnectInd
L2CA_ConnectRspL2CAP_ConnectRsp
L2CAP_ConfigReq
L2CAP_ConfigRsp
L2CAP_ConfigReq
L2CAP_ConfigRsp
L2CAP_DisconnectReq
L2CAP_DisconnectRsp
Device 1 (Master) Device 2 (Slave)
[0, 5]
[0, 5]
[0,∞)
[0, 5]
[0, 5]
[0,∞)
CLOSED
CLOSED
CONFIG
OPEN
[0, 5]
[0, 5]
[0,∞)
W4 L2CAP ConnectRsp
W4 L2CAP DisconnectRsp W4 L2CA DisconnectRsp
OPEN
CONFIG
W4 L2CA ConnectRsp
CLOSED
CLOSED
Figure 5: A message sequence chart of L2CAP
The two outer descriptions represent the states of L2CAP layers.
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CLOSED
W4_L2CA_DISCONNECT_RSP
W4_L2CAP_CONNECT_RSP
W4_L2CA_CONNECT_RSP
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W4_L2CAP_DISCONNECT_RSP
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26.?L2CAP DisconnectReq!L2CA DisconnectInd
28.?ERTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
29.?RTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
30.?L2CAP DisconnectReq!L2CA DisconnectInd
32.?L2CA ConnectRsp!L2CAP ConnectRsp
33.?ERTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
34.?RTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
35.?L2CA ConnectRspNeg!L2CAP ConnectRspNeg
36.?L2CAP DisconnectReq!L2CA DisconnectInd
37.?L2CAP DisconnectReq!L2CA DisconnectInd
38.?L2CAP DisconnectReq!L2CA DisconnectInd
39.?ERTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
40.?RTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
41.?L2CA DisconnectRsp!L2CAP DisconnectRsp
42.?RTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
43.?ERTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
44.?L2CA DisconnectRsp!L2CAP DisconnectRsp
45.?ERTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
46.?RTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
1.?L2CAP DisconnectReq!L2CAP DisconnectRsp
2.?L2CAP ConfigReq!L2CAP Reject
3.?L2CA ConfigReq!L2CA ConfigCfmNeg
4.?RTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
5.?ERTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
6.?L2CAP ConnectReq!L2CA ConnectInd
7.?RTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
8.?ERTX timeout!L2CA TimeOutInd
9.?L2CA ConnectReq!L2CAP ConnectReq
10.?L2CAP ConnectRsp!L2CA ConnectCfm!disable RTX
16.?L2CAP ConfigReq!L2CA ConfigInd
17.?L2CAP ConfigRspNeg!L2CA ConfigCfmNeg!disable RTX
13.?L2CA ConfigRspNeg!L2CAP ConfigRspNeg
23.?L2CA DataWrite!L2CAP Data
15.?L2CAP ConfigRsp!L2CA ConfigCfm, con == 1
18.?L2CA ConfigRsp!L2CAP ConfigRsp, con == 0
20.?L2CA ConfigRsp!L2CAP ConfigRsp, con == 1
14.?L2CAP ConfigRsp!L2CA ConfigCfm, con == 0
21.?L2CAP ConfigReq!L2CA ConfigInd; buffer=2;
19.?L2CA ConfigReq!L2CAP ConfigReq; con=1;
22.?L2CA ConfigReq!L2CAP ConfigReq; buffer=2;
24.?L2CA DataRead; buffer=1;
12.?L2CAP ConnectRspPnd!L2CA ConnectPnd!disable RTX!start ERTX
11.?L2CAP ConnectRspNeg!L2CA ConnectCfmNeg!disable RTX!disable ERTX
25.?L2CAP Data!L2CA DataRead; buffer=1;
27.?L2CA DisconnectReq!L2CAP DisconnectReq!start RTX
31.?L2CA DisconnectReq!L2CAP DisconnectReq!start RTX
Figure 6: CTA of a Bluetooth device
C Description of the six faulty models
All faulty models lead the risk state reachable and violate the safety condition. Re-
call that the safety condition is that while master L2CAP device still stays in the
OPEN state at the time, the slave L2CAP device may not enter the W4 L2CA DISCONNECT RSP
state. We compare the fault and correct behaviors of these faulty models as below:
• Faulty Model1 : The slave will enter into W4 L2CA DISCONNECT RSP
state while receiveing master’s data from network and notifying upper layer.
In the correct model, the slave shall stay in OPEN state.
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• Faulty Model2 : The slave will leave OPEN state and enter intoW4 L2CA DISCONNECT RSP
state while reciveing upper layer’s disconnect command, sending this request
to master through network, and starting the timer. In the correct model, the
slave shall leave OPEN state and enter into W4 L2CAP DISCONNECT RSP
state to wait for the master’s response from network.
• Faulty Model3 : The master remains staying in OPEN state while recive-
ing upper layer’s disconnect command, sending this request to slave through
network, and starting the timer. In the correct model, the master shall leave
OPEN state and enter into W4 L2CAP DISCONNECT RSP state to wait for
the slave’s response from network.
• Faulty Model4 : The master will leave CONFIG state and enter into OPEN
state while reciveing upper layer’s disconnect command, sending this request
to slave through network, and starting the timer. In the correct model, the
master shall enter into W4 L2CAP DISCONNECT RSP state to wait for the
slave’s response from network.
• Faulty Model5 : The slave will leave CONFIG state and enter into W4 L2CAP DISCONNECT RSP
state while receiving upper layer’s configuration response and having received
master’s response. In the correct mode, the slave shall leave CONFIG state
and enter into OPEN state after finishing the configuration process.
• Faulty Model6 : The slave will leave CONFIG state and enter into W4 L2CAP DISCONNECT RSP
state while receiving upper layer’s configuration response but not yet having
received master’s response. In the correct mode, the slave should stay in
CONFIG state since it doesn’t finish the configuration process.
D Coverage estimation with various search strate-
gies
It is also interesting to see how our techniques can be used together with various
trace-generation strategies in symbolic simulation. We only briefly describe the
trace-generation strategies that we have implemented for our experiments in the
following.
• Random Walk Strategy: Each time we execute statement (2), red 4.1 randomly
choose a firable transition to be the sole element in T¯ .
• Game-based Strategy: We use the term ”game” here because we envision the
concurrent system operation as a game. Users can specify some processes to be
treated as players while the other processes are treated as opponents. At each
time we execute statement (2), we either randomly choose a firable transition
from the opponent processes or choose T¯ to be the set of all firable transitions
of the player processes. In this strategy, we alternately execute sequences
of all players’ transitions and sequences of a random-walk of the opponents’
transitons. In this experiment, we view all processes whose local variables
and clocks appear in the safety predicate as players. All other processes are
opponents.
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Strategy Faulty Models Depth ACM RCM TCM Risk state reached?
Random 1 21 34/98 0.437014 0.623092 No
Walk 2 11 23/98 0.181328 0.423497 No
3 11 22/97 0.172719 0.411343 No
4 8 26/97 0.168460 0.217365 No
5 30 44/97 0.294042 0.839828 No
6 19 27/98 0.179093 0.636663 No
Goal 1 15 19/98 0.187034 0.613695 No
Oriented 2 14 12/98 0.164324 0.597204 No
3 8 26/97 0.169848 0.217365 No
4 13 12/97 0.199808 0.597815 No
5 14 28/97 0.157394 0.613456 No
6 19 19/98 0.163539 0.613695 No
Game 1 14 30/98 0.429387 0.421141 No
Based 2 8 26/98 0.160757 0.217143 No
3 23 33/97 0.309106 0.631373 No
4 17 29/97 0.188423 0.429172 No
5 20 32/97 0.183961 0.626350 No
6 24 20/98 0.158451 0.798677 No
Table 3: Coverage estimations with respect to automatic trace generation strategies
for the 6 faulty models
• Goal-oriented Strategy: According to this strategy, heuristics are designed
for the choice of a single transition in each execution of statement (2) in the
hope that a short trace leading to a risk state can be constructed.
Our coverage data with the generation of a single symbolic trace is in table 3. The
experiments shows that it is viable to integrate our techniques with other verification
and simulation techniques.
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